Sulayhid tax-farmers of Aden who kept the port when the state that appointed them fell apart, and who took the losing side of the Isma'ili schism their own queen decided.
conquest1173Smith, E. J. W. Gibb Memorial, New Series XXVI (1974)
How it was governed
3 of 4 coded
Army raised byHow the fighting force was recruited, not how it fought.
tribal levy
Contingents raised through kin or tribal structures the ruler did not create
trans.), Yaman: Its Early Mediaeval History (1892)
Revenue fromWhat the state lived on. The values are unranked: the field cannot express which mattered most.
trade toll
Customs, straits dues and caravan levies
trans.), Yaman: Its Early Mediaeval History (1892)
Succession byThe rule in force, not the outcome. A rule repeatedly violated is still the rule.
No cited figure
Right to rule fromThe ground publicly asserted — on coins, in the khutba, in titles.
caliphal investiture
A grant or diploma from the caliph
Daftary, The Isma'ilis: Their History and Doctrines (2007)
Each line is drawn from a source that addresses the question directly. A line reads No cited figure where no source consulted does — never because the answer seemed obvious.
Turning points
2 hinges
1132The Hafizi choicesuccession crisis
When the Fatimid succession split, the Zurayids in Aden recognised the caliph in Cairo and the Sulayhid mission in the highlands did not. It turned a quarrel over revenue between a port and its former overlord into a confessional division, and it is why one of these two Isma'ili communities still exists and the other does not.
Daftary, The Isma'ilis: Their History and Doctrines (2007)
1173Turanshah at Adensiege
Saladin's brother came down the coast with an Ayyubid army and took the port, ending ninety years in which Aden's customs had belonged to whoever held Aden. From that year the revenue of the richest transit harbour in the Indian Ocean funded a state governed from the Yemeni highlands, and then the Rasulid one after it.
Smith, E. J. W. Gibb Memorial, New Series XXVI (1974)
Chapters
7 in order
The farm that kept itself
Drafted from trans.), Yaman: Its Early Mediaeval History (1892)formation
Ali al-Sulayhi, having taken most of Yemen for the Fatimid mission, needed
someone to hold Aden and remit its revenue. Around 1080 the arrangement settled
on two cousins of the Banu Zuray', a family of the Hamdani tribe of Yam, who
held the port and its customs between them and paid an annual sum up to the
Sulayhid court in the highlands.
This was a tax farm, not a principality. The distinction matters for what
follows, because the Zurayids did not rebel, secede or conquer anything. They
went on collecting, and the state above them fell apart around them, and at some
point the payment stopped going up the mountain and nobody was in a position to
come and ask for it. The dynasty is dated from the appointment, because there
was no declaration to date it from.
What separated them from the Sulayhids was a partition rather than a revolt, and
that is the weakest and most ambiguous way for a state to come into existence:
what the Zurayids acquired was not independence granted or seized, but a piece
of a state that had ceased to be able to hold its pieces together. Queen Arwa's authority contracted to Jibla and its district; Sanaa
went to the Hamdanid sultans; Aden stayed with the men who were already in it.
What made Aden worth the trouble is the subject of the next chapter, and it is
the reason this small dynasty of tax farmers ended up mattering more than the
highland state it came out of.
The queen's dowry
Drafted from trans.), Yaman: Its Early Mediaeval History (1892)expansion
Aden did not become independent in a year. It became independent in four
instalments, each one a smaller fraction of the same tax, negotiated with the
same creditor.
The creditor was Arwa. When Ali al-Sulayhi married his son to her in 1069 he
settled the city of Aden and its district on her as her dowry, and from then on
the revenue of the port was hers personally rather than the state's. It came to
about a hundred thousand dinars a year — sometimes rather more, sometimes rather
less.
At that point Aden was held for the Sulayhids by a family called the Banu Ma'n,
who had taken it along with Lahj, Abyan, Shihr and Hadramawt before the
Sulayhids arrived and had been left in place as governors. They paid the queen
her tribute as long as Ali al-Sulayhi was alive. When he was killed on the
pilgrim road they declared themselves independent.
The two brothers
Al-Mukarram marched down, took the city, and ended the Banu Ma'n. Then he did
something that shaped everything afterwards: he did not appoint a governor. He
appointed two, and divided the port between them.
Al-Abbas ibn al-Karam was given Ta'kar-Aden, the fortress next to the city gate,
with authority over the trade coming in by land. His brother Mas'ud was given
al-Khadra, the castle commanding the water, with authority over the coast and
the shipping and the command of the city itself.
Both were made to swear to the queen, because the revenue they were now
collecting was her dowry.
The arrangement is worth pausing on, because it is the reason there was a
Zurayid dynasty at all rather than a Zurayid governor. Aden's income divided
naturally into a land half and a sea half, and the two halves were given to two
men of one family who did not answer to each other. It made the port stable and
it made it permanently two things, and a hundred years later a war between the
two halves would begin with a dispute about how the revenue was being split.
Four instalments
The default came in stages, and each stage waited for a funeral.
While al-Abbas and Mas'ud lived, they paid the queen in full. When they were
dead, their sons declared themselves independent at Aden. The queen's general
marched on them; there was a war; it ended in a treaty under which half the
revenue would go to her.
When that general died, the princes of Aden stopped paying the half. Another
Sulayhid was sent down and made a new agreement, for a quarter.
Then a rebellion broke out elsewhere in the highlands, and the princes of Aden
stopped paying again. This time nobody came. The queen's leading men were dead
by then, and the officer Cairo had sent to reorganise her government, Umara
notes with what looks like contempt, made no attempt to do anything about it.
From full revenue to half to a quarter to nothing, in three renegotiations, each
one conducted on the death of whoever had enforced the last. No independence was
ever declared and no rebellion succeeded. The tax simply got smaller until it
stopped, and a farm of the customs became a state.
The customs house
Drafted from trans.), Yaman: Its Early Mediaeval History (1892)peak
Aden is a harbour inside a dead volcano on the southern corner of Arabia, and
its importance is a fact about wind rather than about Yemen. The monsoon
divides the Indian Ocean run from the Red Sea run, and ships coming up from
Gujarat and Malabar could not simply carry on to Egypt. Cargo was transferred.
The place where it was transferred took a percentage.
The Zurayid state was that percentage, and nothing else. Every other power in
Yemen had land under it: the dynasties of the coastal plain lived off irrigated
grain, the highland states off terraces, and the Rasulids later off both
together. The Zurayids had no agricultural hinterland worth the name. They had a
gate.
The consequence is that a dynasty with almost no territory could outbid its
neighbours for troops and could matter to powers a very long way off. Merchants
from Egypt and the Gulf and the Indian coast used the port; the Jewish trading
network whose letters ended up in the Cairo geniza ran through it; and the
customs of Aden are the reason the Ayyubids came down to Yemen at all.
How much ground they held is the wrong question to ask about them, and it would
stay the wrong question if somebody produced a good figure for it. The area of
Zurayid authority is not the measure of the Zurayid state. The port was the
polity, and everyone dealing with them knew it.
A hundred thousand dinars
Drafted from trans.), Yaman: Its Early Mediaeval History (1892)peak
In 1152 the ruler of Aden bought a kingdom.
The Sulayhid state had been left by Queen Arwa to a Himyarite lord named Mansur
ibn al-Mufaddal, who had no use for most of it. The Da'i Muhammad ibn Saba
purchased from him the whole of what had belonged to the Sulayhids: twenty-eight
castles and cities, Jibla and Dhu Ashraq and Ibb among them, for a hundred
thousand dinars.
That figure is worth setting against the other one. A hundred thousand dinars was
roughly what Aden's customs brought in for a single year when they were being
paid to the queen as her dowry. The highland core of the state that had once
owned Aden — its capital, its fortresses, its towns — was bought by the port for
about twelve months of the port's own revenue.
Mansur retired to his two fortresses at Sabir and Ta'izz, and divorced his wife.
She was called Arwa, after the queen, and was a Sulayhid herself. Muhammad ibn
Saba went up into the highlands, made Jibla his residence — the town Arwa had
governed from for fifty years — and married the woman Mansur had put away.
The poets, Umara says, outdid themselves on the subject of the fortresses.
What the money was for
There is a temptation to read a purchase like this as decadence, and the man who
made it does not support the reading. Umara knew him personally and describes
somebody entirely deliberate.
He was generous and liked to be praised for it, and was a skilful improviser of
verse himself. He kept a court of jurists, judges, poets, a physician who was
also an astrologer. On a feast day outside al-Juwwah, Umara saw him sitting in
full sun with thirty poets pressing round him, and heard him say: tell them to
stop crowding, and say it loudly, because I am not moving from this spot until
every one of them has finished. He paid all thirty.
Another night at the same palace, with ten poems in front of him, he asked his
courtiers what the authors should get. Nobody suggested more than a hundred
dinars. Make it three hundred, he said. It is little enough.
None of that is idleness. A dynasty of tax-farmers that had defaulted its way
into sovereignty had no lineage worth the name and no religious authority of its
own, and what it had instead was money and the sense to spend it on the people
who decided what was said about you.
Umara steals the prize
The most human scene Umara records anywhere is at that court, and he is the
villain of it.
At the palace of al-Hajr, in a garden, with several poets present, the ruler
improvised two lines in an unusual metre and offered the robes he was wearing
and the money on his person to whoever completed them first. The poets were
slow. The chief judge of al-Janad, a famous extemporiser, got there first — and
was sitting next to Umara.
Umara took the paper out of his hand, got the words ready on his lips, stood up,
and recited them.
He won the money and the robes. He also wrote it down, decades later, in his own
history, in a sentence he plainly liked: his shot hit the mark, but I had
purloined the arrow.
The dynasty that could buy a kingdom for cash also produced a court where the
best-documented theft is of two lines of verse — and the man who committed it is
the reason any of this is on record.
The branch that lost
Drafted from Daftary, The Isma'ilis: Their History and Doctrines (2007)contraction
In 1130 the Fatimid caliph al-Amir was murdered in Cairo and the Isma'ili world
split over who had succeeded him. One party recognised the cousin who took the
throne in Cairo, al-Hafiz, and the line of caliphs after him. The other held
that al-Amir's infant son al-Tayyib was the true imam, that he had gone into
concealment, and that the community should be led in his absence by a chief
missionary rather than by whoever sat in Cairo.
Yemen decided both ways, and the line ran between the highlands and the coast.
Queen Arwa, from Jibla, took the Tayyibi position and appointed the first of the
chief missionaries who have continued the line to the present day; the Sulayhid
page tells that half. The Zurayids in Aden recognised al-Hafiz.
It is easy to read this as the port choosing the side its trade lay on, and that
reading is available: Aden's business was with Egypt, and the Fatimid state was
the customer. It is also insufficient. The Hafizi position was the
institutionally orthodox one — the caliph in Cairo was the caliph in Cairo — and
the Zurayids were recognising the constituted authority of the mission they
belonged to, from a caliph who was alive and reigning and had appointed them.
The outcome is what makes the choice worth a chapter. Hafizi Isma'ilism did not
survive the fall of the Fatimids by very long and has no community today. The
Tayyibi line Arwa chose became the Bohra communities of Gujarat and is alive.
Two polities ninety kilometres apart made opposite decisions about the same
question in the same decade, and one of them is still being lived in.
Turanshah takes the gate
Drafted from Smith, E. J. W. Gibb Memorial, New Series XXVI (1974)end
In 1173 Saladin's elder brother Turanshah came down into Yemen with an Ayyubid
army and took the country in a single season: Zabid from the Mahdids on the
coastal plain, the highlands from what remained of the Sulayhid successors, and
Aden from the Zurayids.
The Zurayid end was not much of a fight. The dynasty's last years had gone the
way the Ziyadids' had gone two centuries earlier and on the same coast — the
government in the hands of the sultans' viziers, the sultans themselves
indistinct even to the chroniclers who lived through it, who do not agree on who
the last of them was. An army arriving from Egypt against a port held by a
household with a garrison had an obvious result.
What ended in 1173 was larger than a dynasty. For ninety years the customs of the
richest transfer harbour in the Indian Ocean had belonged to whoever physically
held Aden, and had funded nobody but him. From that year they funded a state
governed from the Yemeni highlands. The Ayyubids took them; the Rasulids, who
were the Ayyubids' deputies and stayed on when the family went home, built the
wealthiest polity Yemen ever had on them, and the Rasulid record two pages over
is largely an account of what Aden's revenue could buy.
And nothing passed from the Zurayids to the Rasulids in the ordinary sense — no
claim, no institution, no acknowledged connection, and the Rasulids would not
have recognised one if it had been put to them. What passed was the port, and the
port is why both of them existed.
A site chosen by doctors
Drafted from trans.), Yaman: Its Early Mediaeval History (1892)afterlife
Turanshah took Aden, and then had to decide where to govern from.
He had come down from Egypt, broken the power that held the coastal plain, and
extracted from its ruler both a great deal of money and whatever information he
wanted before carrying him along to Aden and taking the port. He settled first at
Zabid, which was the obvious choice: it had been the capital of the lowland for
three and a half centuries.
He formed an unfavourable opinion of its air.
So he went up into the mountains with his physicians to look for somewhere with
a healthy atmosphere and good water, and their choice fell on a place called
Ta'izz, where he founded a city.
That is where the customs of Aden went. Ta'izz became the seat of government for
Turanshah, for the Ayyubids who followed him in Yemen, and then for their own
freedmen the Banu Rasul, who ruled from it for two and a quarter centuries. The
richest transit harbour in the Indian Ocean spent the next three hundred years
paying for a court in a highland town that had been picked out by doctors on
health grounds.
What ended, in one sentence
The chronicler who records this puts a line under the whole period, and it is
worth quoting because it is not the line a modern account would draw.
With the fall of the last of the lowland dynasties, he writes, Arab sovereignty
came to an end in Yemen, and supreme rule was thereafter held by the Ghuzz — the
Turks — and by their freedmen.
That is a South Arabian historian, writing in the fourteenth century, treating
1173 as the year Yemen stopped governing itself. Everything from the Ayyubids
onward is, in his reckoning, foreign rule by Turks and by the slaves of Turks;
and the last of the native dynasties to hold real power were the Zurayids of
Aden and the men who had just destroyed them.
The branch that had nowhere to go
The other thing that ended was a religious allegiance, and this one left no
successor at all.
The Zurayids had taken the office of chief missionary for the Cairo caliphs —
handed to them, in fact, by Queen Arwa herself when she went the other way, with
a remark about the Sulayhids knowing well enough what had become of the hidden
imam. So Aden was the seat of the Isma'ili obedience that recognised the actual,
living, reigning Fatimid caliph, against a Yemeni highland mission that
recognised an infant who had disappeared.
Then Saladin abolished the Fatimid caliphate in Cairo, and Saladin's brother took
Aden. Within two years the branch that had backed the caliph who existed had no
caliph and no state, and the branch that had backed the child nobody could
produce had neither of those things and did not need them.
One of those communities is still here. It is not the one that was right about
where power was.
Two cousins of the Banu Zuray' held Aden and its customs as Sulayhid tax farmers, and kept the port when the state above them contracted to Jibla and could no longer collect from it.
Turanshah took Aden in the same season as Zabid and the highlands, and the customs of the richest transfer harbour in the Indian Ocean passed from whoever physically held the port to a state governed from the Yemeni interior.
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Extent
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Rating
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Reach
No cited figure
Longevity
93 years
21st percentile
Demographic weight
No cited figure
Influence
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Descendant scripts
No cited figure
Religions carried
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Successor claims
No cited figure
Weighted total
21st percentile
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