Fragmentation1347Biran, Qaidu and the Rise of the Independent Mongol State in Central Asia (1997)
Languages of administration
Chagatai Turkic
Mongolian
Writing system: Uyghur-Mongolian
Core region
Transoxiana and the Tarim basin
How it was governed
0 of 4 coded
Army raised byHow the fighting force was recruited, not how it fought.
No cited figure
Revenue fromWhat the state lived on. The values are unranked: the field cannot express which mattered most.
No cited figure
Succession byThe rule in force, not the outcome. A rule repeatedly violated is still the rule.
No cited figure
Right to rule fromThe ground publicly asserted — on coins, in the khutba, in titles.
No cited figure
Each line is drawn from a source that addresses the question directly. A line reads No cited figure where no source consulted does — never because the answer seemed obvious.
Turning points
4 hinges
12261347
1268
The Talas agreementTreaty
Qaidu, an Ögedeid prince with his own claim to the Great Khanship, offered peace to the defeated Chagatayid khan Baraq rather than finishing him - splitting Transoxiana's revenue between them and securing, in the same stroke, an implicit recognition from a reigning Chagatai khan that Qaidu himself was the Mongols' rightful sovereign. From Baraq's death a few years later until his own in 1301, Qaidu ruled the whole khanate through a rapid succession of client khans he installed and replaced himself.
Howorth, History of the Mongols from the 9th to the 19th Century, Part I: The Mongols Proper and the Kalmuks (1876)
1306
Dua absorbs Chapar's own khanateSuccession crisis
Qaidu's own loyal partner for three decades turned on his patron's son within a year of managing his succession, destroyed Chapar's army in a coordinated attack with the Yuan he had once fought alongside Qaidu against, and quietly absorbed most of Chapar's own territory after receiving him as a defeated refugee. It ended the house of Ögödei as a territorial power and left the Chagatai line in sole possession of the throne Qaidu had spent a lifetime deciding who could sit on.
Howorth, History of the Mongols from the 9th to the 19th Century, Part I: The Mongols Proper and the Kalmuks (1876)
1334
Tarmashirin deposed by the annual assemblySuccession crisis
Tarmashirin, a settled, law-abiding Muslim khan who governed from Transoxiana, abolished the annual assembly at which Chinggisid nobles reviewed the khan's own conduct and could depose him for breaking the yasak. The eastern amirs of the steppe did exactly what the abolished institution had once allowed them to do anyway: they assembled without him, deposed him, hunted him down and killed him. Not a religious quarrel - his own successors turned Muslim within a generation - but a verdict on governing from the wrong place, through the wrong people, in a way that made the amirs' own consent unnecessary.
Battuta, The Travels of Ibn Batuta (1829)
1347
Qazan Khan killed, the khanate splits for goodSuccession crisis
Qazan Khan was killed in battle by his own amirs, and no khan afterward ruled both halves of the khanate again. In the west the amir Qazghan took power without the title, ruling through a Chinggisid figurehead - the arrangement Timur would later inherit and perfect. In the east the Dughlat amirs installed a boy said to be the old khan's own son and built Moghulistan around him. The fracture Tarmashirin's 1334 deposition had opened thirteen years earlier finally split the country in two.
Biran, Qaidu and the Rise of the Independent Mongol State in Central Asia (1997)
Chapters
10 in order · about 27 minutes
The khanate that stayed on the steppe
formationDrafted from Biran, Qaidu and the Rise of the Independent Mongol State in Central Asia (1997)
Chagatai's inheritance was Transoxiana and the Tarim — the old Karakhanid and
Kara Khitai lands, containing Bukhara and Samarkand, two of the wealthiest cities
in the Islamic world, and a very large amount of pasture.
Chagatai and his consort, in an Indian copy of Rashid al-Din's history painted about 1590 to 1595.
Raza Library, Rampur · Biran, Qaidu and the Rise of the Independent Mongol State in Central Asia (1997) · Unknown artist · Public domain
The khanate spent a century unable to decide which of those it was. Its rulers
were pulled between the settled Muslim towns that generated revenue and the
nomadic Mongol military that generated power, and every attempt to move toward
the towns — Kebek minting a settled coinage and building a residence near
Qarshi in the 1320s, Tarmashirin converting to Islam in the 1330s — produced a
revolt from the steppe. Tarmashirin was overthrown for it.
The khanate split in the 1340s into a western half, Transoxiana, that became
Muslim and settled, and an eastern half, Moghulistan, that stayed nomadic. This
is the case that shows what the Ilkhanate and the Golden Horde avoided by
converting decisively: the Chagatai state fractured along exactly the seam that
every steppe polity governing farmland has to bridge. The Liao had found the
alternative solution two centuries earlier — two administrations, deliberately
kept apart — and the Chagatai khans never tried it.
Out of the western half, and out of a minor Turkicised Mongol clan within it,
came Timur.
The two countries
The ulus Chagatai received in the 1220s was not one country but two that happened
to be adjacent, and the khanate spent its whole existence failing to be both.
South of the Tian Shan and west of the Pamirs lay Transoxiana: Samarkand, Bukhara,
Khujand, the Zarafshan valley — irrigated, urban, Persian-speaking, Muslim, and the
richest agricultural land between Baghdad and China. North and east lay the steppe
and the mountain pasture, the Ili and the Chu and the Yulduz, which grew nothing and
supported horses.
The khan's army came from the second. The khan's revenue came from the first. No
other Mongol successor state had the two in such equal measure. The Golden Horde
had grass and treated its farmers as tributaries at a distance. The Ilkhans had
cities and went to live in them. The Chagatai had both, in one inheritance, with a
mountain range between.
What the amirs wanted
Not the same thing the khan wanted, and this is the mechanism that wrecked every
reign.
A tribal amir with his own following on the pasture had no interest in his khan
becoming a settled ruler with a capital, a bureaucracy and a standing revenue,
because such a khan would not need him. The amirs' position depended on the khan
remaining what he had been: a first among equals who lived in a tent, moved with
the seasons, and distributed what he took.
So the khanate developed a rule, unwritten and lethal: a khan who spent too long in
Transoxiana, who built, who minted, who governed, was a khan who would be removed.
Kebek tried it and is remembered fondly by the townsmen and hardly at all by the
Mongols. Tarmashirin tried it and was deposed and killed. When the khanate finally
broke in 1347 it broke on exactly that line, and the two halves went in exactly the
two directions.
Poorest, and longest
For all that, it lasted half as long again as the Ilkhanate, and its eastern
successor outlasted the Golden Horde.
The Ilkhans took the richest country any Mongol conquered, governed it properly,
converted, reformed the taxes, patronised the best science in the world — and were
gone in seventy-nine years. The Chagatai stayed poor, stayed mobile, stayed
divided, and lasted a hundred and twenty-one; and their line was still ruling in
the Tarim oases in the seventeenth century.
Being unable to become a state turned out to be survivable. Becoming one did not.
Nikbey, Toka Timur, Dua
formationDrafted from Howorth, History of the Mongols from the 9th to the 19th Century, Part I: The Mongols Proper and the Kalmuks (1876)
Qaidu barely held a title inside the Chagatai khanate at all. He was an
Ögedeid, not a Chagatayid, and
for more than thirty years he was the actual power behind whichever khan of
Chagatai's line happened to be sitting on the throne he had put them on.
A rival Great Khan on the empire's own western half
Qaidu's own claim ran through Ögödei, and by the Mongol empire's own
founding rule the chief khanship belonged to Ögödei's line - which made
Qaidu, in his own eyes and in the eyes of everyone who accepted the
argument, the legitimate Great Khan against Kublai's own usurpation of an
office that belonged to a different branch of Chinggis Khan's house
entirely. He never held Karakorum and never seriously expected to. What he
built instead, over three decades of war against Kublai's Yuan, was
authority over the whole Chagatai ulus exercised through a rapid
succession of client khans he installed, deposed and replaced as it suited
him - Nikbey, then Toka Timur, then, from the late 1270s, Dua.
Talas, 1268
The mechanism by which Qaidu first secured this position was a peace, not a
conquest. Baraq, the Chagatayid khan then ruling Transoxiana, had been
defeated in the field by Qaidu's own ally Möngke Temür of the Golden Horde
and driven back with his army broken. Qaidu offered terms instead of
finishing him: a meeting at Talas in 1268, at which the two princes agreed
that Baraq would keep two-thirds of Transoxiana while the remaining third
went jointly to Qaidu and Möngke Temür, that none of the three would tax
the ruined territory further, and that flocks would be pastured away from
the cultivated land until it recovered. The peace was sealed by rinsing
gold in the cup they drank their oaths from. For Qaidu the substantive
prize was smaller than it looked and larger than it sounds: an implicit
recognition from a reigning Chagatayid khan that Qaidu himself was the
rightful Great Khan of the Mongols, a claim the Chagatai khans would go on
treating as settled for a generation.
A silver coin struck at Samarkand in 1285, in Qaidu's time.
Howorth, History of the Mongols from the 9th to the 19th Century, Part I: The Mongols Proper and the Kalmuks (1876) · CNG · CC BY-SA 3.0
Baraq did not long survive his own defeat. Talked into a disastrous
invasion of Khorasan on Qaidu's own encouragement, he returned with his
army in ruins, fell out with the younger princes he blamed for the
failure, and died before Qaidu - who had marched to his camp with twenty
thousand men, ostensibly to help him punish the deserters - could even
reach him. The Chagatai nobility swore allegiance to Qaidu on the spot.
From that point the throne of Chagatai was his to fill.
Baraq, the Chagatai khan, in a late fourteenth-century painting.
Howorth, History of the Mongols from the 9th to the 19th Century, Part I: The Mongols Proper and the Kalmuks (1876) · Unknown artist · Public domain
The frontier at the edge of the desert
What Qaidu built with that authority was a functioning state in its own
right, with Dua - installed after two shorter-lived predecessors - as his
loyal and long-serving partner rather than his rival. A frontier forty
days wide separated Qaidu and Dua's own territory from Kublai's, watched by
Mongol garrisons on both sides; Marco Polo, who travelled through the
region, records the Uyghur city of Karakhodja sitting neutral between the
two powers. In 1275 the two princes together besieged the Uyghur ruler in
his own capital, trying and failing to force him into an alliance against
Kublai. Two years later, when discontented Yuan princes seized two of
Kublai's own sons in a palace conspiracy, they handed one captive general
straight to Qaidu - proof of how completely his camp had become the
alternative court for every prince with a grievance against the Great
Khan's own line.
Forty-one battles
Qaidu fought the Yuan for three decades without ever losing his own
position, and fought the Golden Horde on his western frontier at the same
time - fifteen battles, by one count, against Nayan's own Jochid line
alone. In 1301 he invaded the heartland of the empire itself in company
with Dua and forty princes of the houses of Ögödei and Chagatai, meeting
the Yuan army between Karakorum and the Tamir river. The battle's outcome
is contested in the sources that survive it, but its aftermath is not:
Qaidu died shortly after, mourned, in the record's own words, "by his
subjects for his humanity and by his troops for his bravery." He had
fought forty-one battles against the Great Khan and other rivals over his
career, and won most of them - the reason, more than any formal
recognition he never received, that so wide a stretch of Central Asia had
spent a generation answering to a man Karakorum never once had to call
its own ruler.
His own daughter, a wrestler of some fame in Marco Polo's telling, is said
to have staked her hand in marriage on the outcome of a match no suitor
ever won against her, and to have fought at her father's side in his wars
afterward rather than accept a husband she hadn't been thrown by.
The partner who outlived him
formationDrafted from Howorth, History of the Mongols from the 9th to the 19th Century, Part I: The Mongols Proper and the Kalmuks (1876)
Dua held the Chagatai throne for close to thirty years, longer than any
other khan in the dynasty's whole history, and for most of that time he
ruled as Qaidu's own loyal partner rather than as an independent sovereign
in his own right. What he did with the seven years he outlived his patron
is a different, sharper story.
A funeral, and a nomination
When Qaidu died in 1301, it was Dua who managed the succession. He
proposed to the assembled princes that Qaidu's eldest son Chapar, then
absent from the camp, be recognised as heir - a debt of his own, since
Chapar had argued Dua's own claim to the Chagatai throne years earlier
when it fell vacant. The nomination carried without opposition, and when
Chapar returned to take up the succession, Dua was the first to pay him
homage.
Then Dua did something Qaidu himself had spent thirty years refusing to
do: he suggested to Chapar that the two of them recognise the Yuan emperor
Temür as the legitimate Great Khan, ending the war their fathers' whole
generation had fought over exactly that question. Chapar agreed, and
envoys went to the Yuan court to offer submission on behalf of both the
houses of Ögödei and Chagatai.
The submission that was not one
Chapar's own submission did not hold. Within the year he had quarrelled
with Dua, who by most readings had simply grown tired of a nominal
overlord asserting an independence Dua no longer thought Chagatai owed
him. Dua offered the Yuan an alliance against his own former ally and set
about the war methodically: a first battle near Samarkand went to Chapar,
a second to his own general reversed it, and when Dua proposed a peace
conference at Tashkent to identify who was really responsible for the
fighting, his own envoy arrived with an army instead and destroyed the
force Chapar's general had disbanded in good faith to attend it. At the
same moment, coordinated with Dua though Chapar did not know it, the Yuan
army broke through the Altai and caught Chapar's own hundred-thousand-man
camp by surprise. Deserted by most of his own men, Chapar fled with three
hundred horsemen - to Dua's own camp, of all places, where his father's
old partner received him with formal honour and then quietly absorbed the
greater part of what remained of his territory.
What thirty years of loyalty bought
Dua died within the year, in 1306, not long after finishing the work of
dismantling the house his own patron had spent a lifetime building
alongside. His son Kebek's predecessor, Kunchek, held the throne only
briefly before Chapar - still alive, still contesting his own diminished
claim - was finally broken for good by a further alliance between the Yuan
and the Chagatai khans, ending the war of succession that had opened with
Kublai's own break from Ariq Böke half a century earlier. Chapar himself
lived out his remaining years doing homage at the Yuan court, the last
Ögedeid prince to matter in Central Asian politics.
What Dua's own reign actually settled was less about who held legitimate
authority than about which of the two rival houses would survive as a
territorial power once the argument was finally over. The house of Ögödei,
Qaidu's own line, disappeared into scattered clans - absorbed by the
Chagatai khans, or drifting west to join the Golden Horde's own
confederacy, where they would later be counted among the founding strength
of the Uzbeks. The house of Chagatai kept the throne, the territory, and -
until Timur's own generation found it useful to keep a Chagatayid
figurehead on it regardless - the title that had once been Qaidu's to give
away three khans at a time.
Nothing of science
expansionDrafted from Battuta, The Travels of Ibn Batuta (1829)
Ibn Battuta crossed the Chagatai khanate in the early 1330s, a hundred and ten
years after Chinggis had passed through it, and what he records is not a ruined
country. It is a country in which some places had recovered and some had not, and
he says which.
Bukhara
He came out of Khwarazm after eighteen days of sandy and uninhabited desert, through
Kath and Wabkana, and reached Bukhara — the principal city of the country beyond
the Oxus.
After it had been ravaged by the Tartars, it almost entirely disappeared: I found
no one in it who knew any thing of science.
That is a scholar's judgement and it is the harshest thing in his book. Bukhara had
been the intellectual capital of the eastern Islamic world; a traveller who went
there specifically to meet its jurists found nobody worth talking to.
Balkh
Across the Oxus, a day and a half over a desert with no house on it, he came to
Balkh — and here the destruction was still total.
It now lies in ruins. It has not been rebuilt since its destruction by the cursed
Jengiz Khan. The situation of its buildings is not very discernible, although its
extent may be traced. It is now in ruins, and without society.
Its mosque had been one of the largest and handsomest in the world, with
incomparable pillars — three of which Chinggis had pulled down, because somebody
told him the mosque's treasure was hidden inside them.
A hundred and ten years, and the outline of the city was still visible in the
ground and nobody was living in it.
The old city walls and citadel of Balkh.
Battuta, The Travels of Ibn Batuta (1829) · Jialiang Gao · CC BY-SA 4.0
Samarkand
And then, twenty days' ride from Balkh, the other half of the answer.
I then proceeded to Samarkand, which is a very large and beautiful city.
No qualification, no ruins, no lament. Samarkand had come back.
Why some and not others
The difference is not how hard each place was hit. It is what each place needed in
order to work again.
A city on a river that runs by itself — Samarkand on the Zarafshan, with its canals
short and its water arriving without help — can be repopulated. A city that depends
on a long artificial system needs the system rebuilt before anyone can live there,
and rebuilding it costs more than founding a new town somewhere easier. Balkh's
water came a long way. Merv's came further.
And a city whose value was its scholars is a different case again, because the
scholars are not replaced by repopulation. They are replaced by two generations of
teaching, by libraries, by endowments, and by somebody wanting to come. Bukhara had
people in it when Ibn Battuta arrived. What it did not have was anybody who knew
anything, because the men who knew things had been killed or had left for Delhi and
Cairo and Anatolia, and the books had burned, and the endowments that paid the
teachers had been confiscated.
What the khanate did about it
Very little, for a century, and that is the charge against it.
The Ilkhans rebuilt: Ghazan's reforms, the observatory at Maragha, Rashid al-Din's
suburb at Tabriz with its hospital and its sixty thousand books. The Chagatai khans
mostly did not, because their army did not want them to and their revenue never
stayed in one pair of hands long enough.
When the rebuilding of Transoxiana finally came it came under Timur, sixty years
after Ibn Battuta's visit — and Timur did it by carrying off the craftsmen of every
city he took and putting them to work at Samarkand.
Kebek's coinage
expansionDrafted from Biran, Qaidu and the Rise of the Independent Mongol State in Central Asia (1997)
For seventy years the Chagatai khans governed the richest cities in Central Asia
without going near them, and the moment one of them tried to, the trouble
started.
The arrangement they inherited
Chagatai's ulus ran from the Ili valley across Transoxiana to the Tarim. It
contained Bukhara and Samarkand, and its rulers lived on the steppe north-east
of them and came nowhere near.
The towns were farmed out. Mahmud Yalavach and after him his son Mas'ud Beg —
Khwarazmian merchants in Mongol service — administered Transoxiana on behalf of
the imperial government rather than the local khan, remitting revenue and
keeping the cities functioning through a period in which the khans themselves
were fighting each other and, repeatedly, the Great Khan.
That produced the strangest fiscal arrangement in the Mongol world: a khanate
whose territory contained enormous urban wealth and whose rulers drew very
little of it, because the collection apparatus reported somewhere else.
What Kebek did
Kebek came to the throne in about 1318 and made the obvious decision. He built a
residence near Qarshi — Qarshi is the Mongol word for palace, and the town is
named after it — which meant a khan living in Transoxiana rather than visiting
it.
Then he reformed the coinage. A unified silver dinar and its half, struck to a
consistent standard across the khanate, replaced the patchwork of local
issues; the coins were good enough that the name survives in the Russian
denga and eventually in dengi, money.
A silver dinar of Kebek, struck at Bukhara in 1322.
Biran, Qaidu and the Rise of the Independent Mongol State in Central Asia (1997) · CNG · CC BY-SA 3.0
And he reorganised the provinces into tümens for administration and taxation
— which is a nomadic decimal unit being used to govern farmland, and is exactly
the kind of hybrid a state in this position produces when it starts trying.
Why it was dangerous
Because every one of those steps moved the centre of gravity from the men on
horses to the men with ledgers.
A khan on the steppe is first among the tribal leaders who elected him and
depends on distributing what he takes. A khan in a palace at Qarshi with a
uniform coinage and a provincial tax administration does not need them in the
same way — and they can see it.
Kebek himself was not deposed. His successor Tarmashirin went further, and was
overthrown for it in about 1334 by an assembly of the very people the reforms
had been making redundant — which is the point at which the khanate stopped
being able to hold its two halves together.
What was actually at stake
Not religion, though the sources put it in religious terms, and not culture.
Revenue and command.
The eastern nomads were not objecting to Islam as such — they converted
eventually themselves. They were objecting to a khan whose income came from
somewhere they had no share in, administered by people they had no hold over,
which would within a generation have made them irrelevant.
They were right, and the western half is what happened when they lost. By the
1360s the Transoxianan khans were ceremonial and the Turkicised tribal amirs of
the region held the power — which is the vacancy an amir of the Barlas walked
into.
The feast he cancelled
peakDrafted from Battuta, The Travels of Ibn Batuta (1829)
Ibn Battuta reached the Chagatai khanate in about 1333, at the one moment when
it looked as though it was going to work, and he records both the height and
the exact constitutional reason it did not last.
The prince
Ala al-Din Tarmashirin he describes as a powerful prince, who has at his
command a large army, and is remarkable for the justice of his laws — a Muslim
khan who kept the prayers, received a visiting jurist properly, and ruled a
territory the traveller places among the four great kingdoms of the world,
alongside China, India and Iraq.
He also gives the cities, and the two entries do not match. Bukhara he found
wrecked: after the Tartars ravaged it, he writes, it almost entirely
disappeared, and I found no one in it who knew any thing of science — a
hundred and ten years after the sack, in what had been one of the great centres
of Islamic learning. Samarkand, a few days east, he calls a very large and
beautiful city.
That is the khanate in two sentences. Enormous wealth, next to a ruin nobody had
rebuilt.
The statute
Then he explains, better than any chronicle does, what a Chinggisid khan was
actually bound by.
One of the statutes of the yasa, he says, was that on a certain day each year
— they call it the feast — the descendants of Chinggis, the governors of the
districts, the wives of the nobles and the general officers of the army must all
assemble. And if the emperor had altered any of the statutes:
the nobles should stand up and say, Thou hast done so and so upon such and
such a day, and hast made an alteration in the statutes of El Yasak, and
therefore, thy deposition is a necessary consequence. They are then to take
him by the hand, and remove him from the throne, and to place in it another
of the descendants of Jengiz Khan.
An annual assembly with the power to depose the sovereign, by naming the
specific day on which he broke the law, and to replace him from within the same
family. Any noble who had committed a crime was tried on the same occasion.
What Tarmashirin did about it
Now, Tarmashirin had entirely abolished the observance of this day, which gave
very great offence.
Some time after Ibn Battuta left, the account continues, the Tartars and their
nobles assembled anyway, deposed him, appointed a relative in his place, and
pressed the matter so far that Tarmashirin fled and was put to death.
The charge is usually reported as apostasy from Mongol custom, and this version
is more precise and more damning. He did not merely stop attending the assembly.
He cancelled the one procedure by which he could be held to account, and the
people it belonged to held it without him and used it on him.
Why that is the peak and not the recovery
Everything Kebek and Tarmashirin had built — the residence in Transoxiana, the
coinage, the provincial administration, the conversion — pointed the khanate at
the settled south. All of it made the annual assembly on the steppe less
necessary to the khan and more clearly the only leverage the steppe had left.
So the reform programme and the thing that destroyed it were the same programme.
A khan who succeeds in becoming a Muslim sovereign of Transoxiana has, by
succeeding, given the men who elected him nothing to do but depose him.
Within a decade the khanate had split in two, and neither half was ever again
worth a visiting traveller's chapter.
The day they took him by the hand
peakDrafted from Battuta, The Travels of Ibn Batuta (1829)
Ibn Battuta left the Chagatai khanate on good terms with its ruler, and then heard
what happened to him. The explanation he was given is the only clear description
anybody wrote down of the constitutional machinery of a Chinggisid state.
The book
Everything rested on the yasak — the code attributed to Chinggis, which Ibn
Battuta understood as a book, and which he says enacted that whoever opposed any of
its statutes should be put out of office.
He may or may not be right that it existed as a written text; that is still argued
about. What matters is that everybody in the khanate believed it did, and behaved
accordingly.
The day
One of the statutes concerned an annual assembly, which the Mongols called the
feast.
On a fixed day each year the descendants of Chinggis, the governors of the
districts, the wives of the nobles and the general officers of the army were all to
come together. And if the ruler had altered any of the statutes in the year, the
nobles were to stand up and say so:
Thou hast done so and so upon such and such a day, and hast made an alteration in
the statutes of the yasak — and therefore thy deposition is a necessary
consequence.
They were then to take him by the hand, remove him from the throne, and put another
descendant of Chinggis in it. On the same occasion, any noble who had committed a
crime was to be judged.
An annual review of the sovereign, by an assembly with the power to remove him for
breach of the fundamental law, and a standing court for the nobility — described by
a Moroccan judge who had just spent some days as the ruler's guest.
What Tarmashirin did
He abolished the day.
Ibn Battuta states it in one flat sentence and lets it do its own work. Now,
Tarmashirin had entirely abolished the observance of this day, which gave very great
offence.
He had reason. Tarmashirin was a Muslim — by some accounts the first Chagatai khan
to make Islam general among his people — who spent his time in Transoxiana, kept
the company of doctors of law, and was praised by Ibn Battuta for the justice of
his laws and reckoned by him one of the four great kings of the world, whose
territories occupy the middle station and to whom the kings of China, India, Iraq
and the Turks all send presents.
He was, in other words, becoming a settled Muslim sovereign. The assembly was the
institution through which the Mongol amirs of the eastern pasture controlled a khan,
and it required him to come east once a year and stand still while they inspected
him.
What happened
Some time, therefore, after we had left the country, the Tartars, together with
their nobles, assembled and deposed him, appointing for a successor one of his
relations; and to such an extent was the matter pressed, that Tarmashirin took to
flight and was put to death.
The machinery worked exactly as described, on a ruler who had tried to switch it
off.
The quarrel in one sentence
This is the fracture that broke the khanate thirteen years later, and it is worth
stating plainly because it looks like a religious quarrel and was not.
The eastern amirs did not depose Tarmashirin for being a Muslim; the khans who
followed in the east became Muslims themselves within a generation. They deposed
him for governing from the wrong place, out of the wrong institutions, with the
wrong people, in a way that made the annual inspection impossible and their consent
unnecessary.
Every steppe polity in this history faced the same choice and most of them made it
by drifting. The Chagatai are the one case where the two answers were argued out in
a formal assembly with a written rule and a named procedure — and where the party
of the steppe won, killed the khan, and then split the country in half anyway.
Two halves, two answers
endDrafted from Biran, Qaidu and the Rise of the Independent Mongol State in Central Asia (1997)
The split of the 1340s gave the khanate two futures, and both happened.
The western half, Transoxiana, went settled and Muslim. Its khans became
increasingly ceremonial and real power passed to the Turkicised tribal amirs of
the region — which is precisely the vacancy that Timur, an amir of the Barlas who
could not himself be khan, stepped into. The Timurid empire is the western
Chagatai khanate's continuation under management that had stopped pretending.
The eastern half, Moghulistan, stayed nomadic and stayed on the steppe, its
rulers keeping Chinggisid descent and converting to Islam later and less
completely. It lasted longer as a Chinggisid polity and left far less behind. Its
successor states in the Tarim persisted into the seventeenth century.
The two halves are the cleanest controlled comparison there is for the question
every steppe conquest state faces. Come inside and you get wealth,
literacy, administration, and a ruling family that ceases to command the men who
put it there. Stay outside and you keep the army and the legitimacy and remain
poor and peripheral.
The Liao tried to have both with two administrations and got two hundred years.
The Jin came inside and got a hundred and nineteen. The Yuan came inside
half-way and got eighty-nine. Nobody found a third answer.
What actually broke in 1347
Qazan Khan was killed in battle by his own amirs in 1347, and no khan afterwards
ruled both halves.
In the west the amir Qazghan took power and did not take the title, ruling through a
Chinggisid figurehead — the arrangement that Timur would inherit and perfect. In the
east, the Dughlat amirs found a boy who was said to be a son of the old khan, raised
him at Aksu, and had a country to run within a few years.
The mausoleum of Tughluq Timur near Almalik, photographed by N. N. Pantusov about 1904.
Biran, Qaidu and the Rise of the Independent Mongol State in Central Asia (1997) · N. N. Pantusov · Public domain
Both halves therefore ended up governed by tribal families holding a Chinggisid in
front of them. The difference was what those families wanted.
The western amirs wanted the revenue of Transoxiana, which meant order in the
cities, which eventually meant a ruler strong enough to impose it and a khan who was
a signature. The eastern amirs wanted the pastures and the right to make khans, and
had no cities to speak of until Sultan Said took Kashgar in 1514.
The comparison
The two halves are the cleanest controlled comparison there is for the question
every steppe conquest state faces.
Come inside and you get wealth, literacy, administration, and a ruling family that
ceases to command the men who put it there. Stay outside and you keep the army and
the legitimacy and remain poor and peripheral.
The Liao tried to have both with two administrations and got two hundred years. The
Jin came inside and got a hundred and nineteen. The Yuan came inside half-way and got
eighty-nine. The Ilkhans came all the way inside and got eighty.
The eastern Chagatai stayed outside, and their line was still ruling in the Tarim
when the Dzungars arrived in the seventeenth century — three hundred and fifty years
later, having done nothing anybody would call an achievement, and outlasting every
one of them.
The amir who could not be khan
afterlifeDrafted from Dughlat, The Tarikh-i-Rashidi: A History of the Moghuls of Central Asia (1895)
The western half of the Chagatai inheritance produced the last world conqueror, and
he spent his entire career unable to use the only title that would have made his
conquests legitimate.
Where he came from
Timur was a Barlas — one of the Turkicised Mongol tribes of Transoxiana, the
military class of the western ulus — and he first appears in the record as a
junior officer deciding which side to take.
Mirza Haydar, quoting the Zafar-Nama, puts him at the crossing of the Khojand
river in March 1360, when Tughluq Timur brought the Moghul army down out of the east
to retake Transoxiana. Timur's own chief, Amir Haji Barlas, collected troops from
Kesh and Qarshi to oppose them, thought better of it, and withdrew to Khurasan.
Timur did not go with him.
That is the whole man in one decision. The country was going to be taken; the
question was who would be running it afterwards.
What he inherited and what he could not
He inherited a country that had been without an effective khan for a generation,
with a tribal aristocracy accustomed to making and unmaking figureheads, and a
Moghul army coming over the mountains every few years to assert a claim that
nobody in Transoxiana wanted honoured.
What he could not inherit was the title. Timur was not a descendant of Chinggis
Khan, and by the rule that governed the whole Turco-Mongol world he could therefore
never be khan.
He did what Edigü would do on the Volga a generation later and what the Manghits at
Bukhara would still be doing four centuries later: he kept a khan.
A Chinggisid puppet of the house of Ögödei sat on the throne. Coins were struck in
the puppet's name. Decrees went out in the puppet's name. Timur called himself
amir — commander — and güregen, son-in-law, because he married a princess of
the Chinggisid line and that was the nearest thing to legitimacy available to him.
A coin of Timur struck at Baghdad in 1393, naming the puppet khan Mahmud.
Dughlat, The Tarikh-i-Rashidi: A History of the Moghuls of Central Asia (1895) · CNG · CC BY-SA 2.5
He conquered from Delhi to Ankara and from Moscow to the Persian Gulf as somebody
else's officer.
What he did with Transoxiana
He rebuilt it, by the only method available to a man with an army and no revenue
worth the name: he took the craftsmen.
The masons, tile-workers, weavers, armourers and glassmakers of every city he
stormed were sent to Samarkand. The wealth of Delhi went to Samarkand. The scholars
went to Samarkand. Ibn Battuta had found Bukhara with nobody in it who knew anything
about science sixty years earlier; within a generation of Timur his own grandson
Ulugh Beg was running an observatory at Samarkand whose star tables were being
copied in Europe two centuries later.
It is the exact reverse of the Ilkhanid method. Ghazan tried to make a conquered
country productive by reforming the way it was taxed. Timur made one city
magnificent by stripping every other city he could reach.
Why he belongs here
Because the Chagatai khanate did not end in 1347. It divided, and both halves went
on — and the western half's continuation is not a khanate at all but the Timurid
empire.
The elements are all Chagatai elements: the Turkicised Mongol tribal army of
Transoxiana, the puppet khan, the Chinggisid legitimism, the amirs who had been
deposing khans since Kebek, and the permanent quarrel with the Moghuls in the east.
What changed is that one amir was strong enough to stop pretending that the
pretence mattered.
His descendants ruled Transoxiana for a century. One of them, driven out of it,
took Kabul and then Delhi, and the dynasty he founded in India was still there when
the British arrived — and it was called, by everyone including itself, the Mughal:
the Persian word for Mongol.
The language, and the name
afterlifeDrafted from Biran, Qaidu and the Rise of the Independent Mongol State in Central Asia (1997)
The Chagatai khanate is the least successful of the four Mongol successor states
and the only one that gave its name to a literary language, an empire in India,
and a modern nation's idea of itself.
Chagatai Turkic
The western half of the khanate produced, over the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries, a literary language: Turkic in the Arabic script, heavily loaded with
Persian and Arabic, and called Chagatai after the khanate it grew up in.
It became the literary standard for the whole Turkic-speaking world east of the
Ottomans, and it stayed that way for four hundred years. Ali-Shir Nava'i wrote
in it at the Timurid court in the 1480s and argued in a famous treatise that it
was capable of everything Persian could do — a case that had to be made, in
Persian-dominated Central Asia, and that he substantially won.
Babur wrote his memoirs in it. So did the khans of Khiva and the Uzbek courts of
Bukhara. Modern Uzbek and modern Uyghur both descend from it directly.
Babur and his army in the Sinjid valley, from a sixteenth-century copy of his memoirs.
Walters Art Museum, Baltimore · Biran, Qaidu and the Rise of the Independent Mongol State in Central Asia (1997) · Unknown artist · Public domain
A khanate that could not decide whether to be a steppe polity or a settled one
is the ancestor of the literary language of every settled Turkic people in
Central Asia, and it acquired that role after it had ceased to exist.
Mughal
The eastern half is where the other name comes from, and the route is
roundabout.
Timur came out of the western Chagatai lands, and his descendants ruled
Transoxiana until the Shaybanid Uzbeks pushed them out at the beginning of the
sixteenth century. One of those displaced Timurid princes, Babur, went south,
took Kabul, and then took northern India.
He called his dynasty Timurid and thought of himself as a Chagatai — his
memoirs use the word for his own people. Everyone else called the dynasty
Mughal, which is simply the Persian for Mongol, and the name stuck to the
largest and richest empire in Indian history.
So the term by which a European or an Indian refers to the Delhi and Agra of
Akbar and Shah Jahan traces back through a displaced Timurid prince to the
second son of Chinggis Khan, whose own khanate had been the poorest of the four.
Moghulistan and after
The eastern half kept the Chinggisid line longest. Its rulers converted to Islam
later, moved into the Tarim oases, and the states they founded there — Yarkand
above all — went on being ruled by descendants of Chagatai into the seventeenth
century, when they passed under the authority of the Dzungars and eventually of
the Qing.
The name of the region in Persian and Turkic sources was Moghulistan, the land
of the Mongols, and the Turkic-speaking Muslim population of the Tarim was
called Moghul by its neighbours for centuries after any of them were.
What the split proved
Come inside and you get the wealth, the literacy and the administration, and
your family stops commanding the men who put it on the throne. Stay outside and
you keep the army and the legitimacy and remain poor.
The Chagatai khanate is the only one of the four that did both, in two halves,
at the same time, and the results are the controlled experiment.
The western half went settled and its khans became ornaments; within a
generation the real ruler was an amir who was not a Chinggisid and had to marry
one. The eastern half stayed nomadic and kept its Chinggisid khans for another
three centuries, and produced nothing anybody outside the Tarim had to take
account of.
Chagatai's inheritance was Transoxiana and the Tarim, containing both the richest cities of Central Asia and the pasture that made settling in them politically impossible.
Timur rose within the western Chagatai lands and took them, ruling as amir and keeping a Chinggisid puppet khan because he could not legitimately hold the title himself.
The Dughlat amirs raised an eighteen-year-old great-great-grandson of Chagatai over the eastern half of the ulus at Aksu; he converted to Islam at twenty-four and took the western half back thirteen years later, the last khan to hold both.
The shaded band is this polity’s span; the dark part of each bar is the stretch the two shared.
Derived from cited spans, not from a separate source. Where both spans are ranges and they meet only on the widest reading of each, the pair is listed as possible rather than resolved to one answer. Unlinked entries are here for scale and are not written up.
Extent
An illustration, not a measurement
Snapshot year
1300
This is the nearest available snapshot to the cited peak of 1310, 10 years away. It is not the peak.
Cited extent
3,500,000 km²
The area of the shape on the left will not match this figure. That is expected. The cited figure is the figure; the map is an illustration, and the two are never reconciled.
Chagatai Khanate, as the snapshot draws it
Everything else on the same snapshot
Land the dataset assigns to no polity, on a modern coastline
Edges are blurred from the dataset’s own border-precision field. Every feature in this period is marked 1, approximate, so every border here dissolves.
The dataset author’s caveat, which belongs here rather than in the footnotes: territorial boundary as a concept is meaningful in Europe only after Westphalia, ancient polities overlap, and old vector borders drawn on modern coastlines mislead because rivers and shorelines move. Boundaries from historical-basemaps, CC-BY-4.0.
Rating
Four axes, all computed from cited numbers and never from editorial judgement. Percentiles are against every polity written up here — 419 of them — plus 49 more included for scale. Absolute figures. A missing axis is excluded from the total rather than counted as zero.
Reach
3,500,000 km²
51st percentile
Longevity
121 years
29th percentile
Demographic weight
No cited figure
Influence
Three separate counts. This site never publishes a single influence number of its own; the sliders on the rankings view fuse them only in your view.
Descendant scripts
No cited figure
Religions carried
No cited figure
Successor claims
No cited figure
Weighted total
40th percentile
computed from 2 of 4 axes, renormalised across the axes that have figures. A polity with two documented axes is not penalised against one with four.