A khanate of one irrigated delta, surrounded on every side by desert, which survived three centuries because nobody could reach it — and financed itself by selling the people it caught on the roads.
Gradual absorption1873Schuyler, Turkistan: Notes of a Journey in Russian Turkistan, Khokand, Bukhara, and Kuldja (1876)
Languages of administration
Chagatai Turkic
Persian
Writing system: Arabic
Core region
Khwarazm — the delta of the Oxus below the Turkmen desert
How it was governed
4 of 4 coded
Army raised byHow the fighting force was recruited, not how it fought.
tribal levyContingents raised through kin or tribal structures the ruler did not create
land grantService in return for assigned revenue — iqta', timar, jagir
Vámbéry, Travels in Central Asia (1864)
Revenue fromWhat the state lived on. The values are unranked: the field cannot express which mattered most.
land taxTax on agricultural production and land
trade tollCustoms, straits dues and caravan levies
plunderCampaign proceeds treated as structural income
Vámbéry, Travels in Central Asia (1864)
Succession byThe rule in force, not the outcome. A rule repeatedly violated is still the rule.
tanistryLateral seniority within the ruling house
Vámbéry, Travels in Central Asia (1864)
Right to rule fromThe ground publicly asserted — on coins, in the khutba, in titles.
descentDescent from a house or lineage, publicly invoked
Howorth, History of the Mongols from the 9th to the 19th Century, Part II: The So-Called Tartars of Russia and Central Asia, Division II (1880)
Each line is drawn from a source that addresses the question directly. A line reads No cited figure where no source consulted does — never because the answer seemed obvious.
Turning points
6 hinges
15111873
1511
Ilbars takes Vezir and UrgenchSiege
Invited by conspirators against the delta's Persian governor, Ilbars massacred the garrison at Vezir in a single night, took Urgench by the sword soon after, and founded a khanate that would spend the next century fighting off Bukhara and its own cousins in roughly equal measure - the appanage system that had won the family Transoxiana producing, in Khwarazm, three rulers in Ilbars's own line dead by execution or ambush within a single generation of his death.
Howorth, History of the Mongols from the 9th to the 19th Century, Part II: The So-Called Tartars of Russia and Central Asia, Division II (1880)
1621
The river deserts UrgenchCapital move
Abu'l-Ghazi rode to the old capital and found it almost empty: the Amu had taken another course and abandoned its old bed, and the land around the city could no longer be watered. The seat of the khanate moved to Khiva, which had a canal that still ran. Nowhere else did a state's capital depend so nakedly on which way the water happened to be going.
Howorth, History of the Mongols from the 9th to the 19th Century, Part II: The So-Called Tartars of Russia and Central Asia, Division II (1880)
1643
A khan who wrote the historyReform
Abu'l-Ghazi Bahadur Khan took the throne after a youth spent fleeing his own brothers and years of exile in Persia, and then did something no other ruler on this steppe did: he wrote the history of his own house and its neighbours, from the Mongols down to his father's murder. Almost everything known about Khwarazm before him rests on it.
Howorth, History of the Mongols from the 9th to the 19th Century, Part II: The So-Called Tartars of Russia and Central Asia, Division II (1880)
1804
The Qungrats take the titleSuccession crisis
The inaq family of the Qungrat tribe, who had governed for the puppet khans for two generations, set the last of them aside and took the throne themselves. Like the Manghits at Bukhara they were Uzbeks and not Chinggisids; unlike them they called themselves khan anyway.
Howorth, History of the Mongols from the 9th to the 19th Century, Part II: The So-Called Tartars of Russia and Central Asia, Division II (1880)
1806
Iltazar drowns crossing the OxusBattle
Two years after declaring himself khan outright and dismissing the ceremonial Kazakh figurehead the Qungrat inaqs had ruled through for two generations, Iltazar overreached into a war with Bukhara that ended with his own escape boat sinking under the weight of his own fleeing men. His brother Muhammad Rahim, who escaped the same rout, spent the next two decades turning Iltazar's one-afternoon improvisation into a government that actually lasted.
Howorth, History of the Mongols from the 9th to the 19th Century, Part II: The So-Called Tartars of Russia and Central Asia, Division II (1880)
1873
The columns convergeSiege
The desert that had destroyed a Russian expedition in 1717 and turned back another in 1839 was crossed by three columns at once, and the khanate that had been unreachable for three centuries was taken in a summer. The khan kept his throne and signed away the right bank, the indemnity, the tariff and the slaves.
Schuyler, Turkistan: Notes of a Journey in Russian Turkistan, Khokand, Bukhara, and Kuldja (1876)
Chapters
9 in order · about 22 minutes
A delta with a desert round it
formationDrafted from Howorth, History of the Mongols from the 9th to the 19th Century, Part II: The So-Called Tartars of Russia and Central Asia, Division II (1880)
Khwarazm is an irrigated island. The Oxus comes down out of the mountains, spreads
into a delta before the Aral Sea, and around that green triangle in every direction
there is sand — the Kara Kum to the south, the Kizil Kum to the east, the Ust-Urt
plateau to the north-west, the Caspian beyond that.
Everything about the khanate that grew there follows from the geography.
Why it existed
It was one of the oldest settled countries in Central Asia and one of the richest
per acre, because the delta silt and the canals grew wheat, melons and cotton in a
place that has almost no rain. It was also, by the sixteenth century, politically
separate from Transoxiana in a way it had not always been, because the desert
between them was two weeks wide.
When the Uzbek conquest swept south out of the Kipchak steppe, the Shaybanid
princes who took Khwarazm were a different branch from the ones who took Bukhara,
and the two lines stayed distinct and hostile for three hundred years. Ilbars took
the country in 1511 — Abu'l-Ghazi dates it 911 of the Hijra, and Howorth points out
that this is clearly a mistake — and his descendants held it.
Why nobody could take it
Because to reach it you had to cross the desert, and armies that crossed the desert
arrived in no condition to fight.
The walls of the Itchan Kala, the inner town of Khiva.
Howorth, History of the Mongols from the 9th to the 19th Century, Part II: The So-Called Tartars of Russia and Central Asia, Division II (1880) · Adam Harangozó · CC BY-SA 4.0
That single fact protected the khanate against Persia, against Bukhara, and for a
century and a half against Russia. Peter the Great sent an expedition under Prince
Bekovich-Cherkassky in 1717 that reached the country and was destroyed there. A
second Russian attempt turned back. The desert did the work.
It also meant that everyone who did make the journey — merchants, pilgrims, envoys,
Persian peasants caught in a raid — arrived exhausted, and that the roads across it
were the khanate's hunting ground.
The other consequence
A small, wealthy, unreachable state on the edge of a desert full of Turkmen
horsemen has one obvious export, and Khiva made it an institution.
The slave trade was not incidental. Persians taken on the Khorasan
frontier and Russians taken on the Caspian shore were brought to the Khivan markets
in numbers large enough to constitute an economy, and the khanate's relations with
Persia, with Russia and with the Turkmen tribes on whom it depended for both
cavalry and captives were all organised around it. Vámbéry, travelling with a
Turkmen caravan in 1863, met Persian slaves at every stage, and a Russian sailor
among them.
Abolishing it was the first thing the Russians wrote into the treaty in 1873.
What kind of state
Vámbéry's summary of the constitution is that it was of Mongol origin: a khan or
padishah chosen from the midst of a victorious race, with a fixed set of named
officers beside him.
In practice the khan disposed despotically of the property and lives of his
subjects, with no check on him except the ulema, and then only when the ulema were
led by men whose learning and irreproachable lives had made them objects of
affection to the people and of dread to the khan.
That was the theory in 1863. By then the khans had for two generations been
whatever their prime ministers said they were.
Branches tied to a saddle
expansionDrafted from Howorth, History of the Mongols from the 9th to the 19th Century, Part II: The So-Called Tartars of Russia and Central Asia, Division II (1880)
Ilbars founded a state by massacre and his own grandsons nearly ended
it the same way. For the khanate's first half-century the throne of
Khwarazm changed hands almost as often through a cousin's ambush as
through a natural death.
What Ilbars actually did
Invited into the delta by conspirators against its Persian governor,
Ilbars took the town of Vezir in a night massacre that left one Persian
alive to carry the news to Urgench, then took Urgench itself and put its
defenders to the sword. He sent for reinforcements from the Kipchak
steppe rather than reward the men who had fought for him - advice one
old Uyghur counsellor warned him against and was overruled on - and by
the time he died, Ilbars and his crippled brother Balbars, who fought
from a chariot and was reckoned a formidable archer despite it, had
pushed the khanate's raiding range deep into Khorasan.
Three thrones in four years
What followed shows exactly what an appanage state without a strong
khan looked like in practice. Ilbars's nephew Sultan Haji held the
title for a year while his cousin held the real power and the first
mouthful at every meal, then died. Hassan Kuli succeeded him and was
besieged at Urgench for four months by his own jealous kinsmen - a
siege bad enough that a donkey's head, unclean food by any standard,
sold for fifty tengas - and was executed as blood price when the city
finally fell. Sofian Khan, who took the throne next, found a steadier
footing: he collected tribute from the Turkoman tribes by force where
necessary, and when Shah Tahmasp of Persia wanted an alliance against
the Ottomans badly enough to ask for a bride of Chinggisid blood, sent
his own niece to Qazvin in exchange for nine of everything precious a
Safavid court could send back.
The trick with the branches
The most memorable of Sofian's own successors was Din Muhammad, son of
a khan who had disliked him from birth for the accident of his slave
mother. Captured as a young raider and sent home humiliated in chains
by a rival prince, Din Muhammad grew into the family's most audacious
survivor. When Shah Tahmasp's army captured one of his border towns, he
rode into the Shah's own camp with fifty men, kissed his host's robe,
and asked forgiveness - and the Shah, checking whether the man's heart
was beating faster than normal and finding it was not, pardoned him on
the spot and gave the town back. When Bukhara's Ubaydullah Khan marched
thirty thousand men against an ally of his, Din Muhammad had each
soldier tie branches to his saddle and horse's tail and advance in loose
order across open ground, so that the moving cloud of dust and foliage
looked like an army many times its real size; the Bukharans retreated
without a fight, and Din Muhammad took Merv for himself and reigned
there until his death.
What sixty years of this bought
Nothing settled, and everything survived. By the time Din Muhammad's
own descendants were fighting Hajim Muhammad's sons over an illegitimate
succession at Merv - the next khan's whole story - the delta khanate
had outlived four assassinated or executed rulers, a dozen appanage
wars among Ilbars's own grandchildren, and every attempt by Bukhara to
absorb it, on the strength of the same desert that had let Ilbars take
it from Persia in the first place: nobody could hold what they couldn't
comfortably reach.
Four kerseys sold
expansionDrafted from others, Early Voyages and Travels to Russia and Persia (1886)
An English merchant looking for a trade route to China rode through
Khwarazm in 1558 and found a country that could barely support the
caravan that was trying to sell it cloth. What he saw, and what the
Uzbek chronicles record about the khan he met, are the same story told
from opposite sides of the same market.
What Jenkinson found
Anthony Jenkinson reached Urgench two days after leaving Sellizure and
paid the customary dues to a khan's brother; the town, he was told, had
been won and lost four times by civil war in seven years, and there
were so few merchants left, and those so poor, that he sold only four
kerseys of cloth in the whole city. Further down the Oxus, at Kait, a
local prince's escort fed itself heartily at his expense for three days
and then demanded an exorbitant payment to go any further; when it was
refused they abandoned the caravan outright, and a banished prince with
a handful of followers attacked it soon after, driven off only by the
guns Jenkinson had brought with him. He describes five brothers,
sons of different mothers - some of slaves - who spent as much energy
destroying each other as ruling the desert route between the delta and
Persia, and a country whose caravans crossed a landscape of feuding
appanage-holders rather than a single administration.
Hajim Khan
The man whose family Jenkinson was navigating around was Hajim
Muhammad, proclaimed khan at thirty-nine after the extinction of
Bujugha's whole line in a single day of killing. Hajim had already made
his name years earlier persuading Din Muhammad to drive the Bukharans
out of Khwarazm and then personally negotiating the prisoner exchange
that followed; as khan himself he spent decades holding the family's
fractured inheritance together against Bukhara's own repeated
invasions - one of which, under Abdullah Khan II, turned back twice
rather than fight Hajim's relief columns in the field. Jenkinson left
Urgench carrying four of Hajim's own envoys back to Moscow, and in 1595
a further embassy went from Khwarazm to the Tsar seeking the same
friendship on Hajim's behalf.
What Arab Muhammad inherited
Hajim's son Arab Muhammad succeeded him and opened his own reign the
way the family always had: at war. Within months a hundred Cossack
raiders sacked Urgench itself, killing over a thousand people and
loading a thousand wagons with plunder before Arab Muhammad cut off
their retreat, besieged their improvised riverside fort, and destroyed
what was left of them. A Kalmyk raid followed within the year, then a
palace conspiracy to replace him with a rival prince of Ilbars's own
line, crushed before it could act. It was the same pattern the khanate
had run on since 1511 - a khan's authority proven not by how peacefully
he ruled but by how many attempts to unseat him he survived - and it was
the reign into which Arab Muhammad's own sons, Habash and Ilbars, were
born: the two boys whose 1618 revolt against their father is where this
khanate's own chronicle, written by their younger brother, begins.
The khan who wrote it down
peakDrafted from Howorth, History of the Mongols from the 9th to the 19th Century, Part II: The So-Called Tartars of Russia and Central Asia, Division II (1880)
Nearly everything known about Khwarazm before the eighteenth century comes from a
book written by one of its khans about his own family, and his family behaved
appallingly.
What he recorded
Abu'l-Ghazi Bahadur Khan was a son of Arab Muhammad Khan, and the story he tells
about his father is not flattering to anybody in it.
Around 1618 two of his brothers — Habash, aged sixteen, and Ilbars, fourteen — rose
in revolt from Khiva and marched on Urgench. Summoned to their father and offered
a governorship, they refused to come until they had gathered a force, and the
adventurous young Uzbeks came in to them. Their father was too weak or too indulgent
to stop it. They raided Khorasan, sent him presents out of the proceeds, and came
back and camped outside his capital.
The khan sent an officer to look at them. The officer came back and reported that
every Uzbek from Darughan Ata to Bakirghan Ata had joined them and that he had been
received with shouts of defiance, and advised retreat to Khiva.
The Khan was a weak person — Abu'l-Ghazi's own phrase about his father, and, as
Howorth notes, a fact the historian cannot hide. He did not send to find out whether
the report was exaggerated. He left for Khiva at once.
The grain
The detail that shows what kind of historian Abu'l-Ghazi was is what comes next.
The whole district from Mizdakhkan to Kuighun, he says, was one large field of
wheat — because the year before he was born his father had cut a canal running by
Tuk and Kuighun into the Aral Sea, closed when the sun was in Libra and opened again
after harvest, and years later more than a bowshot across. In consequence wheat was
very cheap.
The rebels seized the state granaries and won the poor over by distributing the
grain.
That is a man explaining a political collapse by way of hydraulic engineering and
the price of wheat, in the 1660s.
The end of the family
His father ceded the town of Vezir to the rebels and they lived there quietly for
five years. In the sixth, Ilbars seized Khiva, sent five hundred men to take his
father prisoner on the road home, scattered his treasures — among the dogs and the
birds — and deposed his officers.
Abu'l-Ghazi and another brother sided with their father, and argued with him, in
vain, that this was the moment to crush the rebels. He vacillated and leaned on an
atalik who was secretly with the other side. Five months later he changed his mind
and marched on his sons in open daylight instead of surprising them as Abu'l-Ghazi
advised, and was beaten at the canal of Tashli Yarmish and taken.
Habash had him blinded. He was sent to Khiva and then to Qum with three wives and
two younger sons. The next year Ilbars had him put to death, with a brother and two
nephews. Another brother was sent off to Russia, where he died in 1648 and was
buried at Kasimov in a hospice built by his widow — the daughter of a Kasimov khan,
in a Tatar appanage inside the Russian state.
Abu'l-Ghazi went to Bukhara, and then into a long exile in Persia, and came back
twenty years later to take the throne.
Why the book matters
He had every reason to write a lie and did not write one.
He records that his father was weak, that his brothers were fourteen and sixteen
when they began, that the Uzbeks deserted the khan, that the rebels were more
popular because they gave away the grain, and that the whole thing ended with a
blinded old man dying in Qum. He also records the canal, the dates, the tribal
divisions, the routes and the genealogies, which is why every later account of
Khwarazm — including the one in front of you — is downstream of him.
The rulers of the other two Uzbek khanates left no comparable book. That is the one
respect in which Khiva, the smallest and poorest of the three, is the best
documented.
How much longer must I support this puppet
contractionDrafted from Howorth, History of the Mongols from the 9th to the 19th Century, Part II: The So-Called Tartars of Russia and Central Asia, Division II (1880)
By the middle of the eighteenth century the khan of Khiva was a Kazakh prince
imported for the purpose, kept in seclusion and shown to the people three times a
year.
The inaqs
The real government belonged to the inaq — the prime minister, the senior bi of
the Uzbek tribes. The office had become hereditary in the Qungrat family, who were
also governors of Hazarasp, and by the 1750s they had made the khanship ornamental.
The daily routine of the arrangement survives. The khan sat in brocade; every day
the inaq and the grandees had an audience with him; the courtiers went to the palace
and the inaq sat beside him. Ishmed became inaq in 1755 and held the post for
seventeen years, and the office passed from father to son after him.
The towers of the Kunya Ark, the citadel of the khans in Khiva.
Howorth, History of the Mongols from the 9th to the 19th Century, Part II: The So-Called Tartars of Russia and Central Asia, Division II (1880) · Petar Milošević · CC BY-SA 4.0
Why keep a khan at all? For the same reason the Manghits kept the Janids at
Bukhara and Edigü kept khans at Sarai: because the title required Chinggisid descent
and the Qungrats did not have it. So they sent to the Kazakh steppe for a Jochid,
installed him, fed him, and did not let him be seen.
Iltazar
Ivaz Inaq died in 1804. The eldest son declined the succession in favour of his
brother Iltazar, who was proclaimed inaq and for six months paid his daily respects
to the Kazakh khan in the citadel.
Then he called his brother in one night and made the case.
Timurlenk, Nadir Shah, and Muhammed Rahim of Bukhara were none of them khan's
sons, but men like themselves who had earned their own fortunes.
Thanks to God, I have judgment, courage, and soldiers. How much longer must I
support this puppet?
His brother approved and recited the fatiha over it. The next day Iltazar had the
Kazakh khan brought out of the fortress and sent home, telling him that another
would be sent for to fill his place. Instead he raised ten thousand Uzbeks in
armour, summoned the ulema, the ataliqs and the inaqs, and told them he had become
their ruler himself and they had no further need of a Kazakh khan.
Everyone assented and called down blessings on him except Bek Pulad, the ataliq of
the Uyghur tribe, who said it was not worthy of him, that he should imitate his
father and his ancestors, and that it might not be God's pleasure that he should
bring so grave a matter to a happy conclusion. Since everyone else was unanimous he
eventually acquiesced. Iltazar remembered it.
The same year, two khanates
It is worth putting the two events side by side, because they are the same event.
At Bukhara in 1785 the Manghit ataliq set aside the last Janid and took power, and
solved the descent problem by calling himself amir instead of khan. At Khiva in
1804 the Qungrat inaq set aside an imported Kazakh and took the title of khan
anyway, and dared anybody to say otherwise.
Both dynasties were Uzbek tribal families that had been running the administration
for generations. Both ruled until 1920. Neither had a drop of Chinggisid blood, and
by the nineteenth century it no longer mattered — which is the real end of the
Mongol political inheritance in Central Asia, two centuries after the last khan who
could actually claim it stopped mattering.
A bat that comes out at twilight
contractionDrafted from Howorth, History of the Mongols from the 9th to the 19th Century, Part II: The So-Called Tartars of Russia and Central Asia, Division II (1880)
Iltazar drowned trying to conquer Bukhara less than two years after
seizing the throne he had just invented for himself, and his brother
turned the same family's second attempt into the state that actually
lasted.
Dismissing a puppet
Iltazar became Inak on his own brother's death and moved within days:
he raised ten thousand armoured Uzbeks, summoned the ulema and the
tribal notables, and told them plainly he was ruler now and they no
longer needed a ceremonial Kazakh khan to rubber-stamp it. Only one man
in the room objected - the Atalik Bek Pulad, who urged him to follow
his ancestors' example rather than seize the title outright - and
Iltazar remembered the objection long after everyone else had
acclaimed him. He crushed the Yomut Turkomans who refused his new
tribute terms, forced a marriage on a reluctant seyid's daughter to
found his own line, and eventually had Bek Pulad cut down at the palace
door as he left an audience, provoking a short revolt from the man's own
Uyghur tribe that ended, in a contemporary Bukharan envoy's phrase, in
"the kind of peace imposed by the wolf."
Confidence turned to overreach in 1805, when Iltazar raided the
outskirts of Bukhara itself and made off with fifty thousand sheep. The
Bukharan amir finally moved against him in force the following year;
Iltazar's own crossing of the Oxus by boat became a rout when too many
of his own men crowded aboard and sank it, drowning him along with two
of his brothers. A third brother, Kutlugh Murad, was captured and sent
to Bukhara as a hostage-governor. A fourth, Muhammad Rahim, got away.
The brother who consolidated
Muhammad Rahim was installed as khan by the Khwarazmians before his
captured brother could even return from Bukhara to claim the succession
himself - and Kutlugh Murad, to his credit, simply accepted the
demotion to inak rather than contest it. The two brothers spent the
next two decades doing methodically what Iltazar had tried to do by
raid: Muhammad Rahim executed sixty tribal grandees he had lured to a
banquet under pretence of rewarding them, crushed his own rebellious
uncle, and conquered the long-independent Aral Uzbeks after a fugitive
in the rival khan's own service assassinated him in his sleep and
delivered the head to Khiva in a sack. Muhammad Rahim married the dead
man's daughter, binding his own line to the old Khwarazmian royal stock
by marriage rather than by conquest alone, and spent the rest of his
reign extracting tribute from the Kazakh clans along the frontier
instead of merely raiding them.
The mausoleum of Muhammad Rahim Khan in Khiva.
Howorth, History of the Mongols from the 9th to the 19th Century, Part II: The So-Called Tartars of Russia and Central Asia, Division II (1880) · Nassima Chahboun · CC BY-SA 4.0
What the two reigns actually built
Iltazar had proven a Qungrat inak could simply stop pretending to serve
a khan; Muhammad Rahim proved one could actually govern as one, for
decades rather than months, without losing the throne to the next
ambitious cousin. By the time his own son Allah Quli succeeded him, the
dynasty Iltazar had declared into existence over one afternoon's
unanimous applause was no longer an improvisation - it was the only
government Khwarazm had left.
Forty-headed coats
contractionDrafted from Vámbéry, Travels in Central Asia (1864)
In the summer of 1863 a lame Hungarian in rags, travelling as a dervish returning
from Mecca, was brought before the khan of Khiva and asked to bless him. What he
saw in the days that followed is the most specific account there is of how this
khanate rewarded its soldiers.
The audience
Vámbéry knew the risk exactly. The khan was in the habit of enslaving strangers of
doubtful character — he had recently done it to a Hindustani who claimed princely
birth and was now dragging artillery carriages — and the khan's cruelty, Vámbéry
notes, was displeasing even to the Tatars.
At the gate the pious handed bread and dried fruit up to them on their camels. In
the bazaar people kissed his hands and feet and the rags hanging off him. At the
customs house an Afghan in the caravan announced loudly that they had brought to
Khiva three interesting quadrupeds and a no less interesting biped, and the words
spy, Frenghi and Russian went round in the whispering.
He got through it by presenting himself to a former Khivan ambassador to
Constantinople who could not afford to admit he did not recognise him, and by
producing an Ottoman passport with the sultan's seal at the top, which the minister
kissed and pressed to his forehead.
The khan was on a dais with his left arm on a velvet cushion and a short golden
sceptre in his right hand. Vámbéry recited a sura, two blessings and a prayer and
everybody stroked their beards. He was offered twenty ducats and a stout ass;
declined the money as sinful for a dervish, took the ass, and pointed out that the
holy commandment prescribed a white one.
The Kalta Minor, the unfinished minaret begun in Khiva in the 1850s.
Vámbéry, Travels in Central Asia (1864) · Dudva · CC BY-SA 4.0
Afterwards, alone in his cell, he wrote what he had actually seen: deep-set eyes, a
chin thinly covered with hair, white lips, a trembling voice — the real picture of
an enervated and savage tyrant — and let out a long breath at how well it had gone.
The coats
While collecting his board money from the treasurer, he found that official sorting
robes of honour to be sent to the army in the field.
There were about four kinds, silk, in staring colours with large flowers worked in
gold. He heard them called four-headed, twelve-headed, twenty-headed and
forty-headed coats. There were no heads on them, in paint or embroidery, so he
asked why.
The plainest coat was the reward for having cut off four enemy heads. The finest was
for forty.
Somebody suggested that if this was not the custom in the land of Rum, he should go
to the main square next morning and watch the distribution.
The square
He went, and about a hundred horsemen came in from the camp covered in dust.
Each had at least one prisoner with him — among them children and women — bound
either to his horse's tail or to the pommel of his saddle. Each also had a large
sack buckled behind him containing the heads of his enemies, the evidence of his
exploits.
He handed over the prisoners as presents to the khan or some other great man. Then
he unfastened his sack, took it by the two lower corners as if he were about to
empty potatoes, and rolled the heads out in front of the accountant, who kicked
them together into a heap with his feet until it was several hundred high. Each man
was given a receipt for the number delivered, and a few days later came the day of
payment.
What it was for
This was not a pogrom or a massacre. It was a payroll.
The heads were counted by an accountant, recorded on receipts, converted into a
grade of coat and paid out on a scheduled day. The prisoners were transferred as
gifts within the elite. The system was routine enough that a treasurer sorting
garments could explain the price list to a stranger without embarrassment, and that
a bystander could recommend the ceremony as a sight worth seeing.
Vámbéry's own next sentence is the one that has troubled every reader since: that
in spite of these barbarous usages and these startling scenes, it was in Khiva and
its provinces that he passed the most agreeable days of his whole journey, pelted
with gifts by strangers who wanted nothing from him but his blessing.
Both things were true at once, in the same city, in the same week. That is the
hardest thing about the record this khanate left, and the reason for setting it
down exactly as the witness did.
Eighteen tenghe on ten tanab
contractionDrafted from Vámbéry, Travels in Central Asia (1864)
The most useful pages Vámbéry wrote are the driest: a working account of how the
khanate raised its money, which is also an account of who it could not tax and
therefore who really ran it.
Salgit
The land tax. For every ten tanab of cultivable ground — a tanab being sixty
square ells — the khan received eighteen tenghe, about ten shillings.
Exempt from it were three classes: the warriors, the noker or atli; the ulema;
and the khoja, the descendants of the Prophet.
Read that list again. The men with the weapons, the men with the religious
authority and the men with the hereditary prestige all paid nothing. Everybody else
— the Sart farmers of the delta, the irrigators, the townsmen — paid for the state.
No Khivan khan could ever tax the only three groups capable of removing him, which
is a complete explanation of why the khanship went the way it did.
The kushbegi and the mehter collected it, making a circuit every year through the
main districts and holding the local elders responsible for their departments.
Zekiat
The customs. Imported goods paid two and a half per cent of their value. Cattle,
camels and horses paid a tenghe a head and sheep half a tenghe, annually — and only
from owners of more than ten, which is what constituted a herd.
The collection was in the hands of a favourite mehrem of the khan, who went round
the nomad tribes with a secretary. Since the cattle could not be counted, he simply
taxed each tribe at a rate agreed with its elders.
Vámbéry then delivers the punchline without raising his voice. The principal profit
of this operation found its way into the mehter's sack; the khan had been told the
previous year that the Karakalpak had only six thousand oxen and the Yomut and
Chaudor only three thousand sheep between them; and this, Vámbéry was told, was
about a third of the truth.
What the numbers describe
A state collecting a fixed tax from a settled population it controlled, and a
negotiated tribute from a nomad population it did not, with two-thirds of the second
disappearing en route.
The settled delta paid and had no weapons. The Turkmen tribes had the weapons and
paid what they felt like. The khan needed the Turkmen for cavalry and could not
coerce them, and the two groups were not the same people and did not like each
other.
That balance is the whole domestic politics of Khiva, and it is why the khanate
could put a hundred horsemen in the field with sacks of heads and could not have
resisted a European brigade for a week. What kept it alive was never its strength.
It was the desert.
Three columns
endDrafted from Schuyler, Turkistan: Notes of a Journey in Russian Turkistan, Khokand, Bukhara, and Kuldja (1876)
In the summer of 1873 the Russians did the thing everybody had said could not be
done, and the khanate ended in a season.
What had protected it
Peter the Great's expedition under Bekovich-Cherkassky had reached Khiva in 1717 and
been destroyed there. A second attempt, in the winter of 1839, never arrived: the
weather broke the column and it turned back short of the oasis. For a hundred and
fifty years the desert had been a better defence than any army, and the khans had
correspondingly little reason to be careful.
What changed
Steam, the Aral flotilla, the forts up the Syr Darya, the conquest of Tashkent and
the Bukharan settlement of 1868. By 1873 Russia held the whole northern and eastern
approach and could supply columns from bases instead of from the saddle.
Three of them converged on the delta at once — from Tashkent, from Orenburg, from
the Caspian — and the arithmetic that had protected Khiva since Ilbars stopped
working. The city was taken. The khan kept his throne.
He ceded everything on the right bank of the Oxus, paid an indemnity, opened the
khanate to Russian merchants free of duty, accepted that his foreign relations
would be conducted for him — and abolished slavery, which was the institution the
campaign had been publicly justified by and the khanate's oldest industry.
Schuyler
Eugene Schuyler was in Turkistan that year, and his account is the reason
the campaign is known as more than a Russian communiqué.
He was an American consul with no stake in the enterprise, and he wrote about how
the campaign was actually conducted — the treatment of the Turkmen, the conduct of
the troops — in terms that were not welcome in St Petersburg and cost him
professionally. A government that has just liberated slaves does not enjoy being
told what its soldiers did on the way.
The shape of the ending
Set the three khanates side by side and the pattern is exact.
Bukhara lost Samarkand in 1868, signed, and kept its emir until 1920. Khiva lost its
capital in 1873, signed, and kept its khan until 1920. Kokand's khan fled his own
rebels in 1875, and Kokand was annexed outright, wiped off the map and renamed
Ferghana.
The ones that surrendered survived as protectorates. The one that collapsed into
revolt was absorbed. Whether a Central Asian dynasty lasted another half-century
turned not on how hard it fought but on whether it could still control its own
subjects when the Russians arrived.
Khiva could. It had spent three centuries unreachable behind a desert, and it ended
by being the more governable of the two survivors — a khanate of one irrigated
delta, which had lived on a river, a tax on ten tanab of ground, and the people it
caught on the roads.
Khwarazm fell to a different branch of the Shaybanids from the one that took Transoxiana, and the two lines stayed distinct and hostile for three centuries, with two weeks of desert between them.
Khanate of Khiva
1511–1873
What led away
1873Khanate of Khivavassal ofthe Russian Empire
Three Russian columns converged on the delta in the summer of 1873 and took the city; the khan kept his throne and his internal government, ceded everything on the right bank of the Oxus, paid an indemnity, opened his territory to Russian trade, and abolished slavery. Schuyler, who was in Turkistan that year, is not admiring about how the campaign was conducted.
The shaded band is this polity’s span; the dark part of each bar is the stretch the two shared.
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Extent
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Rating
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Reach
No cited figure
Longevity
362 years
75th percentile
Demographic weight
No cited figure
Influence
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Descendant scripts
0
Religions carried
No cited figure
Successor claims
No cited figure
Weighted total
60th percentile
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